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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KIRK W. DALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH STATE
BOARD OF PARDONS, and THE UTAH
STATE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY
REVIEW BOARD,

Case No. 930722-CA
Priority No. 3

Respondents.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1993).
STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

following

statutes,

rules,

and

constitutional

provisions are relevant to a determination of this matter, and are
set forth in Addendum F:
U.S.
U.S.
U. S.
U. S.
U. S.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Const. art. I, § 10 Cl
Const, amend. V
Const, amend. VI
Const, amend. VIII
Const. amend. XIV, § 1
Const art I, § 7
Const art I, § 9
Const art. I, § 12
Const. art. I, § 18
Const. art. V, § 1
Const. art. VIII § 5
17-5 •89 (1991)
Code Ann.
Code Ann.
62A-12 209(1) (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann.
62A-12 229 (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann.
62A-12-223 (1989)
62A-12-240 (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann.
62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992)
Code Ann.
76-2-305(4) (1990)
Code Ann.
77 16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980)
Code Ann.
77 16a-5 (effective March 13, 1990)
Code Ann.
Code Ann.
77-16a-203(3)(a) (effective July 1, 1992)

Utah Code
Utah Code
U.R.Cr.P.
U.R.Cr.P.

Ann.
Ann.
21.5
21.5

§ 77-38-2(6) (1989)
§ 77-38-2(6) (effective March 13, 1990)
(1989) (effective until July 1, 1989)
(1993) (effective July 1, 1989)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The procedural posture of this case is in the nature of
an appellate review of an administrative agency's determination.
The following standard applies to this appeal as a whole:
Under Rule 65B, this court looks at the administrative
proceeding as if the petition were brought here directly,
even though technically it is the district court's
decision that is being appealed.
Since the review
performed by the district court under Rule 65B is a
review of the entire record, it is the same review that
would have been afforded if the matter were raised as a
direct appeal. We give no deference to the district
court's initial appellate review since it is a review of
the record, which this court is just as capable of
reviewing as the district court.
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App.
1991) (citations omitted).
The

following

individual

issues

and

standards

are

1.

Whether the PSRB's transfer of Mr. Dall under a

presented:

"maximum benefit from treatment" standard operates as an illegal
application of an ex post

facto

law in violation of Article I,

section 18 of the Utah Constitution and Article I, section 10,
clause 1 of the United States Constitution, and whether that
standard is arbitrary and capricious?
Standard of review. This is a legal question and should
be determined by the court without deference. Maxwell v. Maxwell,

2

796 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah App. 1990); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585,
586 n. 1 (Utah 1982).
2.

If the "maximum benefit" standard applies to Mr.

Dall, whether the PSRB's finding that Mr. Dall had received maximum
benefit from treatment is adequately supported by the record?
Standard of Review.

To challenge a finding of an

administrative body, appellant must marshal the evidence in support
of the finding and show that the challenged finding is so lacking
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus
making it erroneous.

Smallwood v. Board of Review, 841 P.2d 716,

718-9 (Utah App. 1992).
3.

Whether transfer of Mr. Dall to the Board of Pardons

would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution and the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution?
Standard of review.

See standard for issue no. 1

(question of law reviewed for correctness).
4.

Whether the PSRB's transfer of Mr. Dall to the

jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons constitutes an executive
branch exercise of a power reserved to the judicial branch of
government in violation of Article V, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution?
Standard of review.

See standard for issue no. 1

(question of law reviewed for correctness).
5.

Whether the lack of the right to appeal from orders

of the PSRB violates Mr. Dall's right to due process under Article
3

I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution, and his right to
appeal under Article I, section 12 and Article VIII, section 5 of
the Utah Constitution?
Standard

of

review.

See

standard

for

issue

no.

1

(question of law reviewed for correctness).
6.

Whether denying Mr. Dall compulsory process

and

monies to present his case through expert witnesses violates Mr.
Dall's rights under Article

I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah

Constitution and the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution?
Standard

of

review.

See

standard

for

issue

no.

1

(question of law reviewed for correctness).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Dall pled guilty and mentally ill to Forcible Sexual
Abuse, a second degree felony, and Kidnapping, a second degree
felony, on May 9, 1989. Judge Timothy R. Hanson sentenced Mr. Dall
by order dated August 10, 1989 to concurrent terms of 1 to 15
years, ordered him to the State Hospital and, as required by recent
statutory

changes,

committed

him

to

the

jurisdiction

of

the

Psychiatric Security Review Board ("PSRB").
Effective March 13, 1990 the legislature enacted the
"maximum benefit" standard of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5.

At the

same time, the legislature eliminated appeals from PSRB orders
except for those found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Ann. § 77-38-2(6).
4

Utah Code

In April and June of 1991, the PSRB held hearings to
determine

if

Mr.

Dall

had

received

the

maximum

treatment, and entered orders finding that he had.

benefit

of

See Exhibits 9

(May 24 order, attached as Addendum B) and 10 (July 2, 1991 order,
attached as Addendum C) .

Mr. Dall appealed1 and simultaneously
R. la-5.2

filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus.
trial court denied the petition.

See R. 492-500

entry), R. 568-575 (findings and conclusions).

The

(signed minute

The court denied

Mr. Dall's post judgment motion for stay pending appeal, id., as
did this Court.

Mr. Dall is incarcerated in general population at

the prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
CHARGES
On July

12, 1988, Kirk Dall was

charged

by way

of

Information with Aggravated Sexual Assault, a first degree felony,
Aggravated

Kidnapping,

a

first

Robbery, a first degree felony.

degree

felony,

and

Aggravated

The information alleged that Mr.

Dall kidnapped, raped, and robbed a woman on July 4 and 5, 1988.

Subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
(remittitur).

See R. 68

2

With leave of court, R. 71, an amended petition was filed
March 31, 1992. R. 72-113.
3

Mr. Dall's criminal file in Third District Court, No.
881991695, before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, was separately
paginated and is referred to here as "Crim.". This file was not
reviewed by the PSRB or the district court in this matter, but it
provides useful background information on Mr. Dall, his mental
health status, and the factual predicate to this case. Parts of
this file were entered as Exhibits at the evidentiary hearing
before Judge Lewis, and were reviewed by her.
5

Crim. 6-8.

On December 12, 1988, Mr.Dall was bound over for trial

on all counts.

Crim. 2-3.
ARRAIGNMENT

On January 9, 1989, Mr. Dall was arraigned in Third
District Court before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson.
entered his plea of not guilty to all counts.

Mr. Dall

Crim. 23.

PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
On December 28, 1988, Mr. Dall filed a notice of intent
to rely on a defense of diminished mental capacity.

Crim. 29. On

January 17, 1989, Judge Hanson ordered that Mr. Dall be evaluated.
Crim. 31.

Evaluations were performed by Dr. John Malouf and Dr.

Breck LeBegue. Evaluations from both examiners were considered by
Judge Hanson at the time of Mr. Dall's sentencing, and are
contained in the file in a manila envelope.
(a) Dr. Malouf evaluated Kirk Dall on February 3, 1989.
Dr. Malouf also relied on psychological testing, interviews with
Mr. Dall's family members, jail mental health workers, and review
of Mr. Dall's jail mental health records.
Dr. Malouf reported Mr. Dall's Intelligence Quotient to
be in the dull normal range and that his intellectual functioning
was limited by certain cognitive processes.

He also noticed

evidence of a disorder in "the schizophrenic spectrum likely with
organic involvement." Mr. Dall's performance on testing suggested
"organic impairments of significant level."

The disorder was one

that had been with Mr. Dall since early childhood.

6

Report at 3.

Dr. Malouf described Mr. Dall as a person who is socially
isolated, resistant to change, and who has an idiosyncratic, very
personalized view of the world.
Stevens had diagnosed

He reported that a Dr. Mike

Mr. Dall as being

either autistic

suffering from a pervasive developmental disorder.

or

Dr. Malouf7s

impressions of Mr. Dall were consistent with those diagnoses. Dr.
Malouf stated that "Mr. Dall displays manifestations of a disorder
which first appeared in childhood or possibly at birth." Id. at 4.
Dr. Malouf expressed concern over the possibility of
victimization and concluded by stating, in part, "Mr. Dall is a man
with

considerable

functioning . . . .

deficiencies

in personal

and

interpersonal

His idiosyncratic and very personalized way of

viewing the world and his potential for being victimized suggest
that he be involved in some type of therapeutic program."
(b)

Dr. Breck LeBegue, M.D. submitted two reports to

Judge Hanson.

The first of these reports is dated March 9, 1989

and is based on Dr. LeBegue's evaluations of Mr. Dall on February
20 and March 3 of 1989, interviews with various family members and
mental health workers, and reviews of mental health records.
Dr. LeBegue opined that Mr. Dall "experiences substantial
impairment

from a serious mental illness," Report at 2, and

diagnosed Mr. Dall as having Pervasive Developmental Disorder
(present since childhood) and Schizotypal Personality Disorder.
Dr. LeBegue noted

that

jail mental health workers

and unit

psychiatrists had diagnosed a psychosis and had treated Mr. Dall
with anti-psychotic medications.
7

The "Diagnostic Discussion" portion of the report states:
The
defendant
has a clear history
of
a broad
developmental failure in many areas, dating from
childhood.
He was odd, had significant learning
disabilities in school, profound disturbance in ability
to relate to others, and intermittent bizarre behavior
for many years. This massive disturbance in many areas
of mental function is probably best diagnosed as
Pervasive Developmental Disorder.
This diagnostic
category is not well described in the present diagnostic
manual; but is akin to, but less severe, than childhood
autism.
Further, it is similar to, and perhaps a
predecessor of, adult schizophrenia; in fact, it was
previously called childhood schizophrenia.
Id. at 5.
Dr.
thinking

and

LeBegue

continued,

extreme

social

"The

features

withdrawal

seen

of

psychotic

in

pervasive

developmental disorder do not usually respond to anti-psychotic
medications,

in

contrast

to

adult

onset

schizophrenia.

This

pattern is consistent with Mr. Dall's lack of response to treatment
over the last eight months in jail.
any significant degree."
Dr.
stating

that

mentally ill.

LeBegue
Mr. Dall

He is unlikely to improve to

Id.

concluded

his March

qualified

for a

9,

1989, report

finding

of

guilty

by
and

He recommended additional testing to determine Mr.

Dall's ability to function in a structured halfway house.

He

closed by stating that Mr. Dall would "be at a significant risk to
be harmed or to harm himself if incarcerated at prison."

Id. at 7.

Dr. LeBegue's second report, dated July 18, 1989, was
prepared at the request of Judge' Hanson as a means of providing an
update of Mr. Dall's condition.

Dr. LeBegue concluded at that time

that Mr. Dall did not qualify for a finding of guilty and mentally
8

ill because he did not "pose an immediate danger."

Report at 1.

Dr. LeBegue continued in his diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental
Disorder and noted that Mr. Dall had responded to anti-psychotic
medication. Dr. LeBegue also noted that the psychotic features of
the disorder returned once the anti-psychotic medication was
discontinued.

Dr.

LeBegue

stated

that

"[f]rom

a

medical

perspective, his illness may be safely managed in a corrections
halfway house under constant observation and long term psychiatric
treatment

with

anti-psychotic

medication

and

intensive

psychotherapy to help correct his considerably deviant sexual
fantasies."

Id. at 3. Dr. LeBegue warned, however, that " [i]f he

discontinues his medication he does pose a danger to himself and
others in the foreseeable future (2-4 months), regardless of where
he is housed.

Even on medication, he is at risk of victimization

if imprisoned, due to his continuing oddities of behavior and poor
social skills and judgement."

Id. (emphasis added).

PLEA BARGAIN
On May 9, 1989, Mr. Dall entered a plea of guilty and
mentally ill to one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second degree
felony, and one count of Kidnapping, a second degree felony. Crim.
42-48.
ordered.

A diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Hospital was
Crim. 49.
SENTENCING HEARING
On July 28, 1989, a sentencing hearing was conducted

before the Honorable Timothy Hanson.

Crim. 61.

Prior to the

hearing Judge Hanson reviewed the reports submitted by Dr. Malouf
9

and Dr. LeBegue.

See transcript of Proceedings of July 28, 1989

(Exhibit 2, hereafter "Sent.") at 3-4.
Monica Ebert testified at the hearing.

Dr. Breck LeBegue and
Agent Kathy Shepherd of

Adult Probation and Parole likewise testified.
(a)

TESTIMONY OF DR. BRECK LeBEGUE

Dr. LeBegue was called on behalf of Mr. Dall.
stipulated to Dr. LeBegue's qualifications.

The State

Sent, at 6.

Dr.

LeBegue testified that he reviewed several sources of information
including psychological assessments, statements of mental health
professionals, statements of family members, reports of jail mental
health professionals, and police records.
Dr. LeBegue testified that Kirk Dall was suffering from
a mental disease or defect as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305
and

diagnosed

Mr. Dall

as having

a

Pervasive

Developmental

Disorder, a "major impairment of thinking and mood and behavior."
Sent, at 8.
personality.

He also diagnosed Mr. Dall as having a withdrawn
Dr.

LeBegue

described

Pervasive

Developmental

Disorder as follows:
It is first a severe mental illness. It's manifested
usually in childhood, usually before school age, and the
symptoms are impairment in mental function in many, many
areas. There's usually impairment in the development and
use of language.
There is impairment in social
development such that people do not develop the usual,
easy, normal, social relationships with other people,
either with other boys or girls.
They have odd
mannerisms, odd behavior that may at times seem
irrational, and totally unrelated to fads, or to choice.
They have odd thinking styles. They have unusual moods,
or changes of mood, from one mood to another. And this
persists throughout life. That is, it usually starts
young, persists into the teen years, and on into adult
years.
10

Sent, at 9-10.
Dr. LeBegue testified that the diagnosis was reached
through examinations and evaluation of Mr. Dall's behavior and
mannerisms throughout his life time. Mr. Dall was not a person who
suddenly became psychotic, but was rather a person who had
exhibited "a whole history of deficits in a variety of areas for a
long period of time."

Sent, at 11.

Mr. Dall also exhibited

behaviors characteristic of brain damage which, by his estimate,
had been present a long time.

Sent, at 12.

Dr. LeBegue also observed characteristics in Mr. Dall
consistent with the existence of Savantism, which he described as
"an unusual pattern of surprising mental ability in contrast to the
rest of the academic or intellectual achievement."

Sent, at 13.

Savantism is an organic disorder of brain structure and function.
Mr. Dall came to the attention of jail mental health
workers within four days of being booked into jail.

Dr. LeBegue

reported a disturbance of mood and indicated that Mr. Dall behaved
in ways so irritating to inmates around him that he provoked a
"potential assault upon himself."

Sent, at 18.

Dr. LeBegue

described Mr. Dall as "confused" and clearly delusional.

Dr.

LeBegue reported that Mr. Dall banged on his cell, thought he was
at the cafe where he had worked, assaulted and threatened jail
personnel, and tried to dig out of his cell.

Sent, at 19.

Mr.

Dall improved "to some extent" with anti-psychotic medication, but
his thinking "did not normalize, did not return to clear, rational,
sequential, logical thinking."

Sent, at 20.
11

Dr. LeBegue stated

that Kirk Dall "clearly decompensated" in the jail and stated that
"off medication in another correctional setting, the behavior in
the jail . . . can accurately predict behavior in prison if he's
off medication or on inadequate doses or in a heavy
situation."

stress

Sent, at 21.

Dr. LeBegue reiterated his concern about the potential
for victimization in a correctional setting. Dr. LeBegue testified
that it was likely that Mr. Dall would be victimized in prison:
He provokes others without knowing it. He does odd, or
unusual, provocative things that make other people angry.
He doesn't intend to do so and in a correctional setting,
he'll be at risk to be assaulted.
It's already been
documented that he was. They had to move him to keep him
from being assaulted previously in jail.
Sent,

at

21.

Dr. LeBegue

opined

that

even with

treatment

consisting of anti-psychotic medication and psychotherapy, Mr. Dall
would be at risk for victimization.
Q [by Mr. Bradshaw]
Also fair to say without
treatment he has the potential for being victimized in
the prison setting?
A [Dr. LeBegue] Well, yes, without treatment, and
perhaps even with treatment, because the medication will
not change his basic style, ineptness, his reading of
special cues. He does not use language well. He doesn't
interpret the language and meaning of others well. And
I think even with treatment, anti-psychotic medication,
in general population in prison he'd be victimized.
Sent, at 25-6.
Dr. LeBegue stated that Mr. Dall could be managed in a
prison setting designed for those people with chronic mental
illness.

Such a facility would necessarily provide 24 hour

observation to monitor the presence of symptoms, the response to
treatment, and side effects.

Sent, at 26.
12

In addition, the

"observation" would have to be of a supportive nature rather than
threatening, frightening, or posing risk of victimization.

The

facility must also assure that Mr. Dall continues to take adequate
doses of anti-psychotic medication and mood stabilizing medication.
Sent, at 27.
If, however, the prison setting failed to provide a
nurturing environment or provided an environment that was as
confrontational as the rest of the prison, Dall would likely be
able to decompensate perhaps even on medication."

The same would

be true in Dr. LeBegue's opinion if Mr. Dall were housed in an area
that did not provide 24 hour monitoring or therapy.

Dr. LeBegue

stated that the potential for decompensation was "greater at the
prison if in general population, not in a supportive environment,"
than at the State Hospital.
(b)

Sent, at 34.

TESTIMONY OF MONICA EBERT

Monica Ebert, a Ph.D. intern at the Utah State Hospital,
also testified.

Ms. Ebert testified that she had evaluated Mr.

Dall by way of a clinical interview and administration of a battery
of psychological tests. Based on her observations and testing, Ms.
Ebert believed that Mr. Dall had the "potential" to be a danger
because of his "tendency to act impulsively, and act on . . .
beliefs he has that might be persecutory in nature."

Sent, at 36-

7. Ms. Ebert diagnosed Mr. Dall as having a "delusional disorder"
which includes "paranoid features."

Sent, at 38.

Ms. Ebert

further testified that "[t]here's a possibility of decompensation
if placed in [prison]" as well as a possibility of victimization.
13

Id.

This

was

due,

in

her

opinion,

to

"the

nature

of

his

personality, it's possible that he may invoke irritation in others.
It's possible that he may not be aware of that, because sometimes
he has trouble understanding the impact he has on others.ff

Sent.

at 39.
Following the testimony of Dr. LeBegue and Monica Ebert,
Judge Hanson began to discuss the placement options available to
him.

In weighing the various options Judge Hanson stated:
And I am pretty much convinced of one thing [,] that Mr.
Dall is not an appropriate candidate for general
population in the Utah State Prison for obvious reasons.
Not the least of which he wouldn't survive in that
setting.

Sent, at 43.
(c)

TESTIMONY OF AP&P AGENT KATHY SHEPHERD

Judge Hanson thereafter heard from Agent Kathy Shepherd
of Adult Probation and Parole.

Ms. Shepherd was asked to comment

on programs available at the State Prison. Ms. Shepherd noted that
while

the

prison

could

maintain

Mr. Dall

on

medication,

sex

offender treatment for Mr. Dall was virtually non-existent in the
prison setting. Ms. Shepherd discussed the "revamp" program at the
prison as being
Sent, at 48.

"very similar to that offered by Bonneville."

Ms. Shepherd noted, however, that "[t]he person has

to be reasonably well functioning to participate successfully in
that.

And I don't believe given the problems in this situation I

would consider him as an appropriate candidate in any fashion for
that"

Id^
(d)

STATEMENT OF KIRK W. DALL
14

Following argument from Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Vuyk, the
trial court granted Mr. Dall the benefit of the record to make a
statement. Sent. 54-61. This statement is quite illuminating with
respect to Mr. Dall's mental health, and petitioner would refer the
court to that portion of the transcript.
SENTENCE
Based on the testimony presented at the

sentencing

hearing, Judge Hanson ordered that Kirk W. Dall be sentenced to
concurrent terms of incarceration of 1 to 15 years for the crime of
Forcible

Sexual Abuse

Kidnapping.

and

1 to

15 years

for

the

crime of

Crim. 61; Sent, at 64. Judge Hanson ordered that Mr.

Dall be sent to the Utah State Hospital for treatment.

Judge

Hanson based his order on findings that Mr. Dall was mentally ill,
and that the State Hospital was the only appropriate facility in
existence to care for Mr. Dall's unique needs. Sent. 63-70. Judge
Hanson specifically found that "there is no other place besides the
Utah State Hospital," Sent, at 66 and "that commitment to the State
Hospital is the only appropriate facility."

Sent, at 67.

Judge Hanson also made the following findings with respect to
victimization at the State Prison:
It may be that there will be a new program that will be
available by then. But until that time, I'm satisfied
that Mr. Dall needs assistance, and the only place that
can be properly rendered at the present time is the Utah
State Hospital.
I'm absolutely convinced that if I sent him to
the Utah State Prison that he'd last--if he lasted three
weeks, I'd be surprised. He's susceptible to influence.
The evidence is clear that he does things to annoy
people, and that he doesn't understand it, and knowing
the general population at the Utah State Prison, he'd be
15

subjected to all kinds of things that would be
[in]appropriate, many of them life threatening.
And while Mr. Dall has broken the law, I do not
believe that our society has reached the point that we
don't care about people that have problems like his. We
do.
I'm not going to throw him into that den of
in[iquity] out there. And so--I think we all agree on
that.
Sent, at 68.

In addition, in his order of August 10, 1989, Judge

Hanson found "that because of the defendant's mental condition,
there is a

serious risk that he will be harmed or killed if he is

put in the Utah State Prison."

See Exhibit 8 (Order dated August

10, 1989; Crim. 65-66; attached as Addendum A ) .
REVIEW OF SENTENCE
Judge Hanson scheduled review dates to monitor Mr. Dall's
progress and treatment and to determine "whether there is some less
restrictive facility or less expensive facility that provides the
same treatment for Mr. Dall."

Sent, at 67.

On January 22, 1990,

Judge Hanson conducted a review of Mr. Dall's sentence.

As a

result of statutory changes, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 et seq. ,
jurisdiction of Mr. Dall's case had vested with the Psychiatric
Security Review Board ("PSRB").
took no further action.

Judge Hanson was so advised, and

Crim. 69.
FIRST PSRB HEARING

On April 17, 1991,4 a hearing was conducted before the
PSRB to determine whether it was appropriate to transfer Mr. Dall

4

It is not clear from the record whether the first hearing
before the PSRB was held on April 17, 1991. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 24, 1991, list the date as April 19,
1991. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 2, 1991,
list the date as April 17, 1991.
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from the jurisdiction of the PSRB and the Utah State Hospital to
the Utah Board of Pardons and potentially, the Utah State Prison.
The standard of transfer applied by the PSRB was that of "maximum
benefit of treatment."
Prior to the April 1991 hearing, James C. Bradshaw,
attorney for Mr. Dall, requested that the PSRB delineate the
guidelines used to determine transfer. Mr. Bradshaw also requested
permission to appear before the PSRB on Mr. Dall's behalf.

See

Exhibit 6 (letter from James Bradshaw dated January 17, 1991,
attached as Addendum D ) .
On February 25, 1991, Mr. Bradshaw sent a second letter
to the PSRB, requesting the appointment of experts to testify on
Mr. Dall's behalf.

Mr. Dall was, at that point, indigent.

Mr.

Bradshaw expressed concern as to the independence of State Hospital
experts and requested that the State pay all costs "associated with
the retention of independent experts." See Exhibit 7 (letter dated
February 25, 1991; attached as Addendum E) . Mr. Bradshaw's request
for appointment of independent experts was denied.
Mr. Dall was represented by James C. Bradshaw at the
hearing.

The State was represented by Assistant Attorney General

Jeff Hunt.
State

Dr. Philip Washburn testified on behalf of the Utah

Hospital.

Following

testimony

from

Dr. Washburn

and

argument, the PSRB found that Mr. Dall had received the "maximum
benefit from treatment" from treatment and programs at the Utah
State Hospital and ordered that Mr. Dall "be discharged from the
Utah State Hospital and that he be remanded to the custody and
17

jurisdiction of the Utah State Board of Pardons."

See Exhibit 9

(April 24, 1991 Order of the PSRB, attached as Addendum B).

The

PSRB's sole recommendation to the Board of Pardons regarding Mr.
Dall was that his "psychotropic medication be continued."

Id.

SECOND PSRB HEARING
The recording equipment used to preserve the record of
the April

1991 proceedings malfunctioned

and

the record was

destroyed. A second hearing before the PSRB was scheduled for June
28, 1991. As of that time, the PSRB had already concluded that Mr.
Dall had received the "maximum benefit from treatment" as set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5.
On June 28, 1991, Mr. Dall was represented by Mr.
Bradshaw, and the State was again represented by Assistant Attorney
General Jeffrey Hunt. Dr. Washburn was called by Mr. Bradshaw and
once again testified on behalf of the State Hospital. Mr. Dall was
denied the appointment of experts and compulsory process. Evidence
and testimony were presented to determine whether Mr. Dall had
received the "maximum benefit of treatment" even though there had
been a prior finding of maximum benefit in April of 1991.
(a)

TESTIMONY OF DR. PHILIP WASHBURN

As of the time of the June 28, 1991, hearing before the
PSRB, Dr. Washburn was the clinical director at the Utah State
Hospital.

Dr. Washburn participated in evaluations of Mr. Dall.

Dr. Washburn and Dr. Delyse participated jointly in the treatment
of Mr. Dall.

See Transcript of June 28, 1991 Hearing before PSRB,

(Exhibit 1, hereafter PSRB) at 7. During the course of Mr. Dall's
18

treatment and prior to the June 28 hearing, Dr. Washburn reviewed
reports prepared by Dr. LeBegue and Dr. Gregory.
(1)

Diagnosis

Dr. Washburn diagnosed Mr. Dall as having what he termed
to be a "schizo-affective disorder with depressive features."
also diagnosed paraphilia.

He

PSRB at 8. Dr. Washburn noted that Mr.

Dall's personality difficulties extended back into childhood and,
and there had been a variety of personality diagnoses.

He felt it

necessary to "emphasize the complex, difficult, long-term nature of
his mental disorder."

Id.

Mr. Dall's mental health problems

consisted of a "major mental disorder of a . . . more recent adult
onset" and "ongoing personality problems" that extended into Mr.
Dall's childhood.
Dr.
LeBegue's

PSRB at 9.

Washburn

diagnosis

somewhat related.

of

testified
pervasive

that

his

diagnosis

developmental

and

disorder

Dr.
were

Pervasive Developmental Disorder is also known

as "Childhood Schizophrenia." Dr. Washburn concluded that Mr. Dall
suffers from "some type of schizophrenia spectrum disease or a
range

of

diseases

schizophrenia."
(2)

that

would

fit

into

the

category

of

PSRB at 9.
Symptoms Exhibited

Mr. Dall was treated for a schizo-affective disorder and
a schizoid personality.

In addition to his difficulty relating to

and understanding others, Mr. Dall was isolated emotionally and
socially and demonstrated an "affective disturbance in terms of
some depression."

PSRB at 10.

Dall's mood and affect have been
19

"blunted." There was also a serious suicide attempt where Mr. Dall
placed

a plastic

bag

over his

face.

Id.

Mr. Dall

also

demonstrated "a kind of fantasy, delusional kind of thinking which
reflected a thought disorder" which Dr. Washburn found to be "quite
disturbing."

PSRB at 11. Mr. Dall's delusional thinking included

thoughts that through continued imprisonment, Mr. Dall's victim
would come to love him and develop normal relations with him and
thought that Mr. Dall could treat himself.
(3)

Treatment

Mr. Dall had been exposed to a number of treatment
regimens that included various medications and therapy.

Dr.

Washburn characterized Mr. Dall's response to the treatment as
"limited, not as good as we would like." PSRB at 12. Dr. Washburn
explained that the reason Mr. Dall's response was limited was
because of the "long-term nature of his problem."

Mr. Dall's

problems were more ingrained because of their long-term nature. As
a result, the remission of Mr. Dall's symptoms and problems had not
been good.

PSRB at 26.

Mr. Dall had been prescribed a variety of medications
which included neuroleptic (anti-psychotic) medication and antidepressants. Dall was started on Haldol in October of 1989 and was
switched to Navine in November of 1989.
medications.

Both are anti-psychotic

During the time he was on Navine, examiners noticed

depression and prescribed Prozac. Mellaril was tried for a period
of time, but was "rather sedating."

PSRB at 11.

Mellaril was

discontinued on May 10 of 1991 and Mr. Dall was placed on Serentil.
20

PSRB at 16.

According to Dr. Washburn, the Serentil was more

effective in treating Mr. Dall than previous medications.

The

Serentil was less sedating and is better for people who have an
"underlying organic brain impairment."
the Serentil "works best for him."
Dr.

Washburn

Id. Dr. Washburn felt that

PSRB at 17.

testified

that

finding

the

correct

medication for any given person takes time and must be determined
individually.

PSRB at 15.

It is sometimes necessary to try a

number of different medications, particularly "with a person who
has this long term, more deeply ingrained kind of difficulty that
does extend back into childhood and adolescent years." PSRB at 15.
Ironically, it was not until May 10, 1991, some 2 1/2 weeks after
Mr.

Dall's

first

hearing

before

the

PSRB

that

Dr.

Washburn

discovered that Serentil was a better medication for Mr. Dall.
This improvement in Mr. Dall's treatment occurred after the PSRB
had found that he had received "maximum benefit of treatment."

In

fact, Dr. Washburn testified that Dall improved between May of
1991, and June 28, 1991.

PSRB at 37.

People such as Mr. Dall who are prescribed anti-psychotic
and anti-depressant medication need to be monitored.
effects can develop.

PSRB at 18.

Serious side

The medications must be checked

regularly, no longer than every two to three months.

PSRB at 19.

Where there is additional stress, such as the stress presented by
a

prison

increased.

setting,

medication

must

PSRB at 19.
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be

reviewed

and

perhaps

Dr. Washburn acknowledged that Mr. Dall lacked insight
into his mental illness.

He indicated that a lack of insight is

quite common for people who have mental disorders, particularly
with those who have a schizophrenic spectrum disease.

PSRB at 35.

Mr. Dall's ideas that he can cure himself are also symptoms or
products of his mental illness.
(4)

PSRB at 36.

Prognosis

Dr. Washburn testified that the treatment of individuals
with life-long psychiatric thinking disorders is focused on the
reversal of symptoms and preventing decompensation, rather than on
"curing" or "fixing" the individual.

PSRB at 23, 24, 34-35.

To

accomplish this treatment goal it is necessary to administer a
regimen of properly monitored medication and continuing counseling
and therapy.

PSRB at 24-25.

Dr. Washburn indicated that if

medication were either improperly monitored or discontinued or if
therapy were discontinued, Mr. Dall would decompensate.
27, 28.

PSRB at

With schizophrenic patients, the recurrence of major

symptoms can be as high as 60% in one year if they are away from
medication.
Dr.

PSRB at 24.
Washburn

stated

that

there

is

"a

chance

or

likelihood" that Mr. Dall would decompensate if sent to prison.
PSRB at 29. He testified that the State Hospital has had a number
of mentally ill patients go to the prison and decompensate.

PSRB

at 30. Dr. Washburn has seen patients become "really psychotic" in
the prison setting even though they may have been only slightly ill
before prison incarceration.

PSRB at 61-62.
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Dr. Washburn listed

several reasons. Initially, the individual environment changes, as
do stress levels.

PSRB at 29.

In addition, a prison is not a

hospital and does not have the resources of a hospital.
29-30.

PSRB at

The monitoring of medication is more difficult and the

standards of monitoring medication are lower than at a hospital.
PSRB at 30-32.
limited.

Resources for therapy and counseling are severely

In addition, inmates at the prison are permitted to

refuse medication, whereas patients at the hospital are required to
take medication. PSRB at 30. Dr. Washburn testified that very few
individuals in Mr. Dall's situation benefit from transfer from a
hospital setting (with support, residential programs, follow-up
programs and treatment programs), to the Utah State Prison.

PSRB

at 48.
Dr. Washburn concluded that prison treatment of mentally
ill

offenders

is

unacceptable.

Prison

is

a

stress-filled

environment that can adversely effect mentally ill offenders. PSRB
at 19, 29, 39, 31, 54, 56.

Prison is more difficult for mentally

ill offenders to cope with.

PSRB at 61. Dr. Washburn stated that

presently prison treatment of mentally ill offenders suffers from
many problems.

PSRB at 62. Because of the lack of resources and

lack of understanding, prison permits non-treatment to occur. PSRB
at 62. Dr. Washburn also agreed with Dr. LeBegue that there was a
substantial risk that Mr. Dall would be harmed in prison or would
harm himself.
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(5)

Maximum Benefit from Treatment

Dr. Washburn testified that while Mr. Dall had benefited
from his stay at the hospital, he had not received the maximum
benefit from treatment available at the hospital.

In fact, Dr.

Washburn testified that "he can still benefit from being at the
Hospital.

But we have to weigh the costs and benefits."

PSRB at

51.
Dr. Washburn testified that to receive maximum benefit
from treatment, the treatment must be ongoing.
treatment for the rest of his life.

Mr. Dall needs

Maximum treatment for people

such as Mr. Dall has to be ongoing treatment.

PSRB at 39, 40.

If

economics and resources were not a consideration and if Mr. Dall
were in a secure facility, Dr. Washburn would conclude that Mr.
Dall had not received maximum benefit from treatment.
Dr.

Washburn

benefit.

did

not

PSRB at 44.

say

that Mr. Dall

had

PSRB at 39.

received

maximum

Instead, Mr. Dall had reached a "plateau"

where the need for bedspace outweighed the perceived potential
benefit of continued treatment at the hospital.

PSRB at 41.

Dr.

Washburn stated that as a professional, he strives not to make
decisions based on economics alone.

PSRB at 50.

Dr. Washburn testified that in his opinion guilty and
mentally ill individuals need a system different from the prison.
That system would have a hospital for the acute cases and then
residential treatment programs where they could be transferred when
acute treatment is not needed.

PSRB at 41.

"The prison system, to

my way of thinking, would not be the best system."
24

Id.

Dr. Washburn expressed concern over the maximum benefit
of treatment standard.

His initial concern was that the standard

carried with it the connotation or implication of "Okay, now we're
cured, " when in fact "curing" is not the goal of psychiatric
treatment for individuals such as Mr. Dall.

PSRB at 23, 24, 34.

Dr. Washburn stated that the maximum benefit from treatment model
does not fit his way of thinking regarding the treatment of
mentally ill psychiatric patients.

PSRB at 42, 43.

The standard

does not take into account that an individual's treatment needs may
change over time or that an individual such as Mr. Dall may require
future hospitalizations. PSRB at 43. In addition, caseloads at the
prison are so high that they exceed what Dr. Washburn would
consider an acceptable manageable professional standard.
54.

PSRB at

Dr. Washburn expressed concern over the size of the prison

caseload and the ability of the prison staff to provide treatment.
Id.
Following the hearing the PSRB ruled again that Mr. Dall
had received the "maximum benefit from treatment at the Utah State
Hospital."

PSRB at 65. The PSRB entered an ordered dated July 2,

1991, directing that "Kirk Wesley Dall be discharged from the Utah
State Hospital

and that he be remanded

to the

jurisdiction of the Utah State Board of Pardons."

custody and
The order

directed that Kirk Dall remain in the custody of the State Hospital
"until such time as the Board of Pardons conducts a hearing and
custody is assumed by the Board of Pardons." See Exhibit 10 (July
2, 1991 Order of the PSRB; attached as Addendum C) . The order made
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no recommendations to the Utah Board of Pardons regarding treatment
or placement of Mr. Dall.

Id.

EVIDENTIARY HEARING
An evidentiary hearing in petitioner's case was held
before the trial court on June 14, 1993.

Testimony was taken from

Dr. Philip Washburn, Dr. Robert J. Howell, and Mr. Robert Verville.
See

transcript,

R.

603-721.

The

following

exhibits

introduced:
1 - Transcript of PSRB hearing of June 28, 1991, with
exhibits (referred to herein as "PSRB").
2

-

Sentencing hearing transcript
(referred to herein as "Sent.").

(July

28,

1989)

3 - Settlement Stipulation in Henry v. DeLand, case No.
89-C-1124J in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah.
4 - [Not received into evidence]
5

- Transcript of January 22,
conducted by Judge Hanson.

1990

review

hearing

6 - Letter dated January 17, 1991 from Mr. Bradshaw to
PSRB.
7 - Letter dated February 25, 1991 from Mr. Bradshaw to
PSRB.
8

-

Sentencing

order

in

State

v.

Dall,

case

881991695, dated August 10, 1989.
9 - PSRB order dated April 24, 1991.
10 - PSRB order dated July 2, 1991.
11 - Application and order for stay in this case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
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no.

were

The "maximum benefit" standard was enacted after Mr.
Dall's offense and sentencing. Application of that standard to Mr.
Dall increases the severity of his punishment, and is thus an
illegal application of an ex post

facto

law. The "maximum benefit"

standard is also arbitrary and capricious.
The evidence at the PSRB hearing did not support the
PSRB's finding that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit from
treatment.

To the contrary, the evidence showed that Mr. Dall

would continue to need treatment for the rest of his life.
Transfer of Mr. Dall to the prison would constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, and unnecessary rigor.

The prison is not

adequately equipped to deal with persons such as Mr. Dall.
The PSRB'S action is an unlawful exercise of judicial
power by the executive branch of government in violation of Article
V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.

The failure to provide

judicial review of PSRB actions renders the delegation of power to
the

PSRB

unconstitutional.

Additionally,

Mr.

Dall's

constitutional right to appeal has been infringed.
Finally, Mr. Dall was denied compulsory process and
financial access to expert testimony to present his case.
The order of the trial court denying the petition for
writ of habeas corpus should be reversed.

The order of the PSRB

should be reversed and vacated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PSRB'S APPLICATION OF THE
MAXIMUM BENEFIT STANDARD TO MR. DALL IS
AN ILLEGAL APPLICATION OF AN EX POST
FACTO LAW.
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The PSRB applied the "maximum benefit from treatment"
standard of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 to Mr. Dall in making its
determination that he should be transferred to the jurisdiction and
custody of the Board of Pardons.
until March 13, 1990.5

This standard was not adopted

The PSRB's attempted application of this

new substantive standard to Mr. Dall is an illegal application of
an ex post

facto

law in violation of Article I, section 18 of the

Utah Constitution, and Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the
United States Constitution.
It has been generally held and is well settled
that:
any statute which punishes as a crime an act
previously committed, which was innocent when
done; which makes more burdensome the
punishment for a crime, after its commission,
or which deprives one charged with crime of
any defense available according to law at the
time when the act was committed, is prohibited
as ex post
facto.
State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1218

(Utah 1986)

(quoting

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed.2d 216
(1925)).
"[0]ne is not barred from challenging a change in the
penal code on ex post facto grounds simply because the sentence he
received under the new law was not more onerous than that which he
might have received under the old."
282, 300, 97 S.Ct. 2290,

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S.

, 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 360 (1977); accord

5

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 was repealed effective July 1,
1992. The "maximum benefit" standard is currently codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-16a-203(3)(a) (Supp. 1993).
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Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432, 107 S. Ct. 2446,

, 96

L.Ed.2d 351, 361 (1987).
The correct inquiry here is whether there was fair notice
and governmental restraint shown with respect to Mr. Dall, not
whether he had a vested right to be incarcerated at the hospital
rather than the prison:
The presence or absence of an affirmative right is not
relevant, however, to the ex post facto prohibition,
which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe
than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be
punished occurred. Critical to relief under the Ex Post
Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less
punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental
restraint when the legislature increases punishment
beyond what was prescribed when the crime was
consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal
provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it
violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and more
onerous than the law in effect on the date of the
offense.
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30-1, 101 S.Ct. 960,
17,

24

(1981)

(finding statute reducing

, 67 L.Ed.2d

"gain time credits"

available to inmates for good behavior while incarcerated to be ex
post

facto

as applied to a prisoner whose crime was committed

before effective date).

Although Mr. Dall concedes he has no

vested right to incarceration at the hospital, he is entitled to
fair notice and governmental restraint when the State changes the
substantive

legal

standard

under

which

such

transfers

are

evaluated.
This case must be distinguished from State v. Burgess,
870

P. 2d

276

(Utah App.

1994) .

Burgess

concerned

whether

application of the review procedures of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203
was ex post

facto

as to Burgess when § 77-16a-l et seq. were in
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force at the time of his offense.

No change in standard occurred;

maximum benefit is utilized under both these transfer procedures.
In fact, Burgess conceded that he is better off under the new
statute.

Id. at 280 n.6.

In the instant case, the change was

substantive and worked to Mr. Dall's detriment.

Burgess sheds no

light on the inquiry here.
At the time of Mr. Dall's offense, plea, and sentencing,
the codified

standard

in effect

for transfer of mentally

ill

offenders from the hospital to the prison is found in Utah Code
Ann. § 77-16-5:
77-16-5.

Recovery of committed person -- Certification
to Board of Pardons.

(1) A person committed to the state hospital after
sentence who has sufficiently recovered from his mental
disease or defect shall be certified to the Board of
Pardons by the clinical director.
Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person
shall be transferred to the Board of Pardons and he shall
be pardoned, paroled, or confined in the state prison for
the unexpired term of the offense as provided by law with
credit for time served while confined at the hospital.
The certification of the clinical director of the
hospital shall specify with particularity the medical
facts justifying his certification.
(2) The provisions of law and the rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding
parole shall apply to persons paroled from the state
hospital.
(Emphasis added).

This standard contemplates recovery, rather than

maximum benefit, as the standard triggering transfer from the state
hospital.

In some cases, offenders will "sufficiently recover" to

allow transfer to the prison.

In Mr. Dall's case, such recovery is

an extremely remote possibility.

It certainly had not occurred by

April 1991, by June 28, 1991, or even as of the present date.
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Under

the

appropriate

standard,

Mr.

Dall's

transfer

was

inappropriate as of the present date and any date in the past.
Judge Hanson's original order of commitment expressly found that
Mr.

Dall would be victimized

if placed in prison, and may be

subject to physical harm or even death.
the present time.
stringent

Nothing has changed as of

Transfer to the prison under a different, less

standard

subjected

Mr.

Dall

to

"more

burdensome

punishment" for his crime, in violation of his constitutional right
to be free from ex post
The

maximum

facto

legislation.

benefit

standard

also

irreconcilably

conflicts with the codified standard for discharge of patients from
the Utah State Hospital:
62A-12-229.

Release from commitment.

(3) When the patient has been committed to the
division under judicial proceedings, the division shall
use the procedures described in Sections 62A-12-24 0 and
62A-12-241.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-229 (Supp. 1992).
62A-12-240.

Periodic review and discharge.

The director or his designee shall, as
frequently as practicable, examine or cause to be
examined every person committed to the division.
Whenever the director or his designee determines that the
conditions justifying involuntary commitment no longer
exist, he shall discharge the patient. If the patient
has been committed through judicial proceedings, a report
describing that determination shall be sent to the clerk
of the court where the proceedings were held.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-240 (Supp. 1992).
(1) The director or his designee may release an
improved patient to less restrictive treatment as may be
specified by the director or his designee, and agreed to
in writing by the patient. Whenever the director or his
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designee determines that the conditions justifying
commitment no longer exist, the patient shall be
discharged. If the patient has been committed through
judicial
proceedings,
a
report
describing
that
determination shall be sent to the clerk of the court
where the proceedings were held.
(2) (a)
The director or his designee is
authorized to issue an order for the immediate
placement of a patient not previously released
from an order of commitment into a more
restrictive environment, if the director or his
designee has reason to believe that the less
restrictive environment in which the patient has
been placed is aggravating the patient's mental
illness as defined in Subsection 62A-12-234(10) ,
or that the patient has failed to comply with the
specified treatment plan to which the patient had
agreed in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992).
Mr.

Dall

is

still

mentally

ill.

The

"conditions

justifying involuntary commitment" still existed, so discharge was
not appropriate.6

Mr. Dall had not improved and had not agreed in

writing to transfer to a less restrictive environment, so no such
transfer was appropriate.

The State has not shown that "the less

restrictive environment in which the patient has been placed is
aggravating [Mr. Dall's] mental illness," so transfer to a more
restrictive environment was not appropriate. Mr. Dall should have
stayed at the hospital.
At the evidentiary hearing, the State elicited testimony
indicating that the State Hospital transferred prisoners from the

6

The Court is referred to the testimony of Dr. Washburn at the
evidentiary hearing, to the effect that (except for being somewhat
less depressed) Mr. Dall is much the same person as when originally
committed. R. 630-36.
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Utah State Hospital to the prison under a clinical standard7 that
in fact is similar to the "maximum benefit" standard that was later
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5. Nevertheless, this de
clinical

maximum

benefit

standard

conflicts

with

the

facto
well

established law at that time under Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 and
Title

62A.

The

State

Hospital's

ignorance

of

the

law

and

utilization of its own arbitrary standard in the past in no way
legitimizes application of ex post facto

legislation to Mr. Dall.

Finally, the "maximum benefit standard is arbitrary and
capricious.

It

bears

no

rational

relation

to

the

State's

legitimate interests of penal facility security and treatment of
mentally ill offenders.
1988),

In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah

the Utah Supreme Court declared

subsections

(4) (c) and

(4)(d) to be unconstitutional:
Because the criteria serve a wholly different
function in the guilty and mentally ill statute than they
serve in the involuntary commitment statute, some of the
criteria now contained in section 77-35-21.5(4) are
irrelevant to an evaluation of whether a defendant should
be hospitalized instead of imprisoned. We believe that
subsections (c) and (d) of section 77-35-21.5(4) are not
rationally related to the sentencing process as opposed
to civil commitment.
Id. at 1271.

rationally

Similarly,

the

related

to the

"maximum

benefit"

sentencing

7

standard

process.

A

is

not

significant

Mr. Verville, witness for the State, repeatedly confirmed
that he was unaware of the applicable legal standard for transfer.
R. 683, 699.
Indeed, the State has adduced no evidence that
indicates the PSRB was aware of the correct legal standard.
Actions taken by a quasi-judicial administrative agency without
reference to the applicable law are per
se
arbitrary and
capricious.
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portion of those sent to the State Hospital require ongoing care.
Serious mental
"fixed."

illnesses

are not generally

capable

of being

A more rational inquiry would focus on the individual

treatment needs of each patient/inmate, and what facilities within
the correctional system are adequate to meet the medical needs of
the person.
The "maximum benefit" standard is divorced from this
proper inquiry, and instead may lead to a revolving door policy
where inmates are shipped back and forth between the prison and the
hospital for continuing cycles of stabilization at the hospital and
decompensation at the prison.

See PSRB at 3 0 (testimony of Dr.

Washburn).
The "maximum benefit" standard is ex post

facto

with

respect to Mr. Dall, and is arbitrary and capricious. The order of
the PSRB, as reached under the "maximum benefit" standard, may not
stand.
POINT 11.
EVEN IF THE "MAXIMUM BENEFIT"
STANDARD APPLIES TO MR. DALL, THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE PSRB HEARING
FAILS TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT MR. DALL
HAS RECEIVED THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT OF
TREATMENT.
The evidence adduced at the PSRB hearing fails to support
the PSRB finding that Mr. Dall has received maximum benefit from
treatment.

To the contrary, the evidence shows that Mr. Dall will

continue to need treatment for the rest of his life, and continued
to benefit from treatment at the hospital.

The "maximum benefit"

standard does not make sense as applicable to persons in Mr. Dall's
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situation.

Treatment must be ongoing, and the State Hospital is

best suited to provide that treatment.
Even viewing all of the evidence presented to the PSRB in
the light most favorable to its finding of maximum benefit, the
challenged finding is so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus making it erroneous.

See

Smallwood v. Board of Review, 841 P.2d 716, 718-9 (Utah App. 1992) .
The trial court made the following finding with respect
to the evidence at the PSRB hearing:
The State called no witnesses at the June 28 hearing.
Dr, Philip Washburn was called and examined by counsel
for Mr. Dall, and cross-examined by the State. Dr.
Washburn testified that Mr. Dall had not received maximum
benefit from treatment, and that Mr. Dall must receive
some treatment for the rest of his life. Dr. Washburn
testified that Mr. Dall had reached a "plateau" in his
treatment and was not progressing as rapidly as the
Hospital would like, but that Mr. Dall would still
benefit from further treatment at the Hospital.
R. 569

(Findings %9) .

testimony presented.
detail supra at 18-25.

This finding accurately summarizes the

Dr. Washburn's testimony is described in
The medical reports also reviewed by the

PSRB do not address "maximum benefit" and whether Mr. Dall has
received "maximum benefit."
This evidence fails to support a finding that Mr. Dall
has received "maximum benefit."

When asked directly whether Mr.

Dall had received "maximum benefit," Dr. Washburn indicated that he
had not. Instead, Dr. Washburn indicated that Mr. Dall had reached
a plateau, where he was not progressing as rapidly as desired. The
testimony indicates that the transfer decision, rather than being
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based on "maximum benefit," was based on economic considerations
and the need for more bed space for other mentally ill persons.
The testimony of Dr. Washburn states directly that Mr.
Dall has not received "maximum benefit."

The testimony concerning

reaching a plateau, even viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, does not contradict this conclusion.

Only one witness

testified, and his testimony is directly contrary to the finding
reached by the PSRB.

The PSRB's finding that Mr. Dall has received

maximum benefit is against the clear wight of evidence, and is
clearly erroneous.
The order of the PSRB must be reversed.
POINT

The

III.
TRANSFER OF MR. DALL TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS
CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

eighth

amendment's

cruel

and

unusual

punishment

provision originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, 96 S.Ct. 2909,
859, 872 (1976) .

See

, 49 L.Ed.2d

Its purpose in our constitution is to prohibit

"infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments."
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268, 92 S.Ct. 2726,

Furman v.

, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 367

(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution parallels
the federal constitution but goes one step further:
arrested

or

imprisoned

shall

not
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be

treated

with

"[p]ersons
unnecessary

rigor." At least three other state constitutions contain a similar
unnecessary rigor provision:

Wyoming,8 Indiana,9 and Tennessee.10

The other states with an unnecessary rigor provision
generally

apply

incarceration.

it

to

abuses

which

occur

during

pretrial

See Suter v. State, 88 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1949);

Saunders v. State, 392 S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. 1965).
Of the four states with unnecessary rigor provisions,
only Utah's provision appears in the same section as the cruel and
unusual punishment

section.

The constitution's

drafters, by

including unnecessary rigor and cruel and unusual punishment in the
same

section,

interpreted

as

presumably
part

of

intended
the

that

cruel

and

these

provisions

unusual

be

punishment

proscription, and not as a separate provision regulating jail
conditions.

The unique development of Utah constitutional law

supports this theory.

8

Article I, section 16 of the Wyoming constitution states that
"[n]o person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated with
unnecessary rigor. The erection of safe and comfortable prisons,
and inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners
shall be provided for."
The Wyoming Constitution includes a
separate provision to address cruel and unusual punishments.
Wyoming Const. art. I, § 14.
9

The Indiana Constitution protects persons arrested and
confined in jail:
"[n]o person arrested, or confined in jail,
shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Indiana Const, art. I,
§ 15. Indiana's Article I, section 16 addresses cruel and unusual
punishments.
10

Tennessee provides that " [n]o person arrested and confined
in jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Tennessee Const,
art. I, § 13. Tennessee's Article I, section 14 addresses cruel
and unusual punishment.
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The inclusion of the unnecessary rigor provision in
Utah's constitution is probably in some part a result of the early
Mormon persecutions of the 1830's.

See L. Arrington & D. Bitton,

The Mormon Experiencet 76-77 (1979) ."•

The arrest and murder of

Joseph and Hyrum Smith by vigilantes in 1844 had a profound effect
on the remaining church members and initiated the Mormon exodus to
Utah.

Id.
Persecution of the Mormons continued

in Utah.

The

territory made six unsuccessful bids for statehood between 1849 and
1887.
primary

R. Poll and T. Alexander, Utah's History, p. 243.
obstacle

polygamy.

to

statehood

was

the

Mormons' practice

The
of

Id. Many of the Mormon leaders who moved from Nauvoo to

Utah were tried and jailed for violations of the Morrill Act of
186212 and Edmunds Act of 1882.13
were described as wretched.

The conditions of incarceration

Wallentine, supra at 17.

It was not

uncommon for judges to jail women with small children and place
several prisoners in one cell.

Id.

l:L

Joseph Smith was a self-taught constitutional scholar and
spent countless hours teaching constitutional principles to church
subordinates.
His students later became ecclesiastical and
political leaders that undoubtedly made significant contributions
in drafting Utah's numerous constitutions. See Wallentine, Heeding
the Call:
Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 13 &
n.57 (1991).
12

The Morrill Act prohibited plural marriages, disincorporated
the Mormon church, and restricted church ownership of property to
$50,000. Utah's History, p. 244.
13

The Edmunds Act declared polygamy a felony and defined
polygamous living or unlawful cohabitation as a misdemeanor.
Utah's History, 259.
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When Utah finally achieved statehood in the late 1890's,
the drafters of the Utah constitution considered deleting the
unnecessary rigor language in Article I, section 9.

Those who

criticized the provision pointed out that no other state had that
language

in

its

constitution.

See

Official

Report

of

the

Proceedings and Debates of the Convention to Adopt a Constitution
for the State of Utah, pp. 267-8 (1898).
committee, the provision was retained.

After returning from

Its inclusion is a strong

indication that the drafters felt a need for protections greater
than those found in the federal constitution.

Indeed, the history

of Mormon persecution from the 1830's until 1896 provides ample
evidence that the constitutional drafters were well aware of
improper treatment of accused and incarcerated persons, and were
committed to insuring that it did not continue to occur in Utah.
A

review of Utah's

history

reveals

a

longstanding

recognition of the need for humane treatment of mentally ill
persons and mentally ill offenders. Prior to achieving statehood,
the early settlers established laws and facilities to ensure
appropriate treatment for the mentally ill. Salt Lake City was the
site of the first hospital for the mentally ill in the western
United States.

McKell, History of the Utah State Hospital. Univ.

of Utah Library Archives (unpublished masters thesis) . Twenty-four
years prior to passage of the state constitution, territorial
governor George C. Woods spoke of the need for government to
address the problems of the mentally ill:
We now number about one hundred thousand souls with a
steady and rapid increase from every quarter. We ought
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to have an asylum for the insane. Humanity requires it.
There is no public institution where these poor
unfortunates can be kept. I should fail to do my duty
were I to omit to urge you to take such steps immediately
as will meet this great public want.
Message of Governors 1850-1876, pp 159-60

(Bound volume, Utah

Historical Society).
The laws of the territory provided for humane treatment
of mentally ill offenders:
Every person guilty of any unnecessarily harsh, cruel, or
unkind treatment of, or any neglect of duty towards, any
idiot, lunatic or insane person is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Laws of Utah, 1876, Ch. XI, Sec. 193. Current law codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 62A-12-223 (1989) is to the same effect:
Anyone having care of a mentally ill person who
unduly restrains that person, either with or without
authority, or who treats that person with wanton severity
or cruelty, or in any way abuses that person, is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor, in addition to liability in an
action for damages, or subject to other criminal charges.
Recognition of the treatment needs of the mentally ill
continues to the present day.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89 (1991)

provides " [t]he board of county commissioners of each county shall
provide mental health services in accordance with Chapter 12, Title
62A, and substance abuse services in accordance with Chapter 8,
Title 62A."
The objectives of the state hospital and other mental
health facilities shall be to care for all persons within
this state who are subject to the provisions of this
part; and to furnish them with the proper attendance,
medical treatment, seclusion, rest, restraint, amusement,
occupation, and support that is conducive to their
physical and mental well-being,
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-209(1) (Supp. 1992).
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This statutory scheme requires that the State do more
than stabilize mentally ill offenders and ship them off to prison.
"The moral test of government is how it treats those who are in the
dawn of life, the children; those who are in the twilight of life,
the aged; and those who are in the shadows of life, the sick, the
needy and the handicapped."

Arnold v. Dep't of Health Services,

775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 1989) (quoting Hubert Humphrey).

Arnold

was a class action challenging breaches of statutory duties by the
state

and county

in providing mental

chronically mentally ill citizens.

health

care to

indigent

The Arizona Supreme

Court

affirmed a judgment in favor of the class.14
Utah has fared no better than Arizona in providing mental
health care to its citizens:
This state has failed dramatically in its moral
obligation to provide adequate support systems for adults
disabled by mental retardation, as well as by mental
illness, who enter the criminal justice system. I wish
to underscore the point made by Justice Stewart in
referring to the 1965 report of the Governor's Advisory
Committee on Mental Retardation. Our laws in this area
are useless and archaic, and our policies do not prevent
injustice. It is hoped that the legislature will respond
to this need.
State v.

Murphv,

760 P.2d

280, 289

(Utah 1988)

(Durham,

J.,

concurring).
Finally, it is unfortunate, as Justice Durham
suggests, that the state has largely ignored the problems
presented by the fact that a significant number of people
entering the criminal justice system suffer from mental
illness or retardation. While mandatory incarceration
and ever-longer sentences are politically popular,
14

The Court is referred to the Appendix in Arnold, 775 P. 2d at
538-9, which describes Arizona cases demonstrating the cost to
society of inadequate mental health care.
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spending money to adequately house those confined, much
less treat those suffering from mental problems, is not.
Until we as a society face up to the true consequences of
the penal policies adopted in our name, the courts will
continue to be confronted with agonizingly difficult
cases such as this one.
Id. at 290 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).15
Mr. Dall is seriously at risk for decompensating if
transferred to the prison. As a sex offender with odd behavior and
irrational thinking that impacts negatively on his ability to
interact

and relate with others, he is an unusual

victimization at the prison.

risk for

Mr. Dall does not respond to others

in a logical fashion, and unwittingly provokes others to the point
of anger.

Sent, at 21, 39.
While antipsychotic medication may favorably impact on

Mr. Dall, it does not impact his pronounced inability to interact
with others.

The State has not shown that

the prison can

adequately meet Mr. Dall's needs, or protect Mr. Dall from other

15

The Settlement Stipulation in Henry v. DeLand indicates that,
when forced, the State has made some progress. The Court should
nots that the settlement doesn't contemplate compliance until at
least the fall of 1994. See Settlement at 22 (two year compliance
from court approval), 31 (settlement entered by parties on
September 8, 1992).
The settlement does allow for early
compliance, but the State has presented no evidence that full
compliance has yet been achieved.
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inmates.16

Under these circumstances, the order of the PSRB would

inflict cruel and unusual punishment on Mr. Dall.
POINT IV.
THE PSRB'S ACTION IS AN UNLAWFUL
EXERCISE
OF JUDICIAL
POWER
BY THE
EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
OF
GOVERNMENT
IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Prior to creation of the PSRB, sentencing of mentally ill
offenders was governed by U.R.Cr.P.

21.5

(1989).17

This

rule

provided the sentencing court with several options.

The court

could

every

order

months.

hospitalization,

with

reviews

at

least

In accordance with the law in effect prior to July 1,

1989, this is what Judge Hanson intended to do with Mr. Dall.
Sent, at 43, 63-70.
to

the

six

expiration

See

"Upon a review hearing, to be commenced prior
of

the

previous

order,

an

order

of

hospitalization may be made for an indeterminate period if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the required
conditions of Subsection
period.ff

(4) will continue for an indeterminate

Rule 21.5(5) , U.R.Cr.P. (1989) . If such an indeterminate

16

Mr. Verville testified that individuals with Mr. Dall's
specific diagnosis could be housed anywhere within the prison. R.
688.
The acute care facility for mentally ill offenders, which
provides separation from the general prison population, only has 28
beds.
R.685. Mr. Verville also testified that the Utah State
Hospital has a patient/staff ratio of 1.8.
The Settlement
Stipulation in Henry v. DeLand indicates total mental health
staffing of 22 (Stipulation at 12-3) for a mentally ill inmate
populat ion of 300 (per Mr. Verville, R. 676) to 450 (per
Stipulation at 3, 13 (15% of population mentally ill, inmate
population of 3000)).
The patient/staff ratio in the prison is
thus somewhere in the range of 13.6 to 20.5, or 7 to 11 times
greater than Mr. Verville testified.
17

This was the law in effect at the time of commission of Mr.
Dall's offense.
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commitment
hospital

is ordered by the Judge, then discharge

is governed by Rule 21.5(8)

from the

(providing for hospital

recommendation of discharge to be transmitted to Board of Pardons).
The sentencing court could decline to commit an offender to the
jurisdiction of the hospital (with its concomitant possibility of
transfer from the hospital to the Board of Pardons) by continuing
semi-annual reviews.
In Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 227 Utah Adv.
Rep. 30, 35 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that
"the establishment of an original parole release date is inherently
a sentencing function."

The Supreme Court held that fundamental

principles of due process thus apply.

Similarly, the function

performed by the PSRB was inherently a sentencing function properly
within the ambit of the judicial branch of government.
In creating the PSRB, the legislature delegated this
judicial function of monitoring, determining if hospitalization
continues to be appropriate, and determining if an offender should
be sent to prison from the judiciary to the PSRB.18

This improper

delegation violates the doctrine of separation of powers:
[E]ver since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2. L.Ed.
60, it has been recognized that one department of the
government cannot control the judgment or official acts
of another department, acting within its proper sphere of
governmental power, within the scope of its authority.
. . . But an act which is not within the scope and duty
of executive power, even though and when attempted or
18

Now, Utah law again allows the trial court to retain
jurisdiction over an offender sentenced to the State Hospital.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1) (b) (Supp. 1993). Mr. Dall thus
falls within a limited group of offenders where the judge was
denied this discretion.
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performed by an executive body, may be annulled or
prohibited by the judicial branch. For the executive
bodies, like the individual persons making up the
sovereign people can lawfully exercise only the rights
and powers recognized by law as existing in them.
Mulcahv v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 117 P.2d 298, 299-300 (Utah 1941).
In Berkey v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 670 P.2d 1061
(Or. App. 1983), a challenge was made to the constitutionality of
the delegation of judicial power from the Oregon circuit courts to
the Oregon PSRB.

In affirming the delegation, the court stated:

Delegation of adjudicatory powers to administrative
agencies is valid if judicial review is provided at some
stage of the proceeding.
Id. at 1064.

In this case, the delegation of power from Utah

district courts to the PSRB cannot stand.
provided no opportunity for judicial review.

Mr. Dall has been
He attempted to

appeal the PSRB's decision, but the appeal was dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds.
Asbury v. Lombardi. 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. banc 1993)
is to the same effect:
The exercise of judicial functions by executive
agencies is consistent with traditional concepts of the
separation of powers. The quintessential power of the
judiciary is the power to make final
determinations of
questions of law. Marburv v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.)
137, 2 L,Ed, 60 (1803); [other cites]. This power is a
nondelegable power resting exclusively with the
judiciary. The legislature "has no authority to create
any other tribunal and invest it with judiciary power."
[cite]
Thus, while the legislature may allow for
judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making by legislative
or executive (administrative) agencies, it may not
preclude judicial review of those decisions. Nor may the
legislature alter the principal power of the judiciary to
make the final
review.
Short of these two
considerations, however, there will not customarily be
found a violation of the separation of powers clause.
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(Footnote omitted.).

Asbury held the provisions for appeal from

decisions of the Personnel Advisory Board to be unconstitutional as
violative of the separation of powers clause of the Missouri
Constitution.
Utah case law is in accord.

See White River Shale Oil

Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 700 P.2d
(procedures

for

rehearings

and

for

1088, 1092

application

certiorari provided adequate procedural

(Utah 1985)
for

writ

of

safeguards to sustain

delegation of power); Carlsen v. State Dep't of Social Services,
722 P.2d 775, 778 (Utah 1986) ("When a quasi-judicial function has
been delegated by statute to the administrative body charged with
the responsibility of enforcing the statute, plaintiff does not
have a constitutional right to insist that the agency may only
bring an action in court.

He was afforded an opportunity to

present his claims and defenses to the district court judge [on
appeal] . . .") .
As originally enacted, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6)
provided:
(6) When a person over whom the board exercises
jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by a
final order of the board, that person is entitled to
judicial review of the final order by the Court of
Appeals only if the court finds, based upon a review of
the evidence contained in the record, that there is no
substantial evidence that supports the conclusion of the
board, or that the board's decision was arbitrary and
capricious. If judicial review is granted, the person is
entitled to counsel. If the person is indigent, counsel
shall be appointed in accordance with Chapter 32 of this
title.
This section was amended to provide " [w] hen a person over whom the
board exercises jurisdiction* «&o h&& &$&& &d3u$ie&t$ci &n& £QWX3L to
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be «ot guilty by reason of insanity, is adversely affected or
aggrieved . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) (effective March 13,

1990) (red-lined form).

This amendment completely eliminated Mr.

Dall's right of judicial review.
No judicial officer has determined that the prison is
appropriate for Mr. Dall. To the contrary, Judge Hanson expressly
found that he was "not going to throw him into that den of
in[iquity] out there."

Sent, at 68. The PSRB sentenced Mr. Dall

to prison for the first time, without opportunity for judicial
review.

A habeas corpus action under U.R.C.P. 65B is not the

review the constitution contemplates.

"It is not a substitute for

and cannot properly be treated as a regular appellate review."
Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968) (citing Price v.
Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356); accord
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) .

Without regular

appellate review, the PSRB runs afoul of the separation of powers
clause in Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.

The

PSRB's order cannot stand.
POINT V. THE LACK OF AN APPEAL RIGHT FROM
ORDERS OF THE PSRB VIOLATES MR. PALL'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I.
SECTIONS 7 AND 12, AND ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND
THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The lack of an appeal right from PSRB orders violates due
process under federal and state constitutions, and the right to
appeal under Article I, section 12 and Article VIII, section 5 of
the Utah Constitution.

The Utah Constitution mandates that Mr.
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Dall be granted an appeal.

As originally enacted, Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-38-2(6) did provide a right to appeal, complete with court
appointed counsel if necessary.

The March 13, 1990 amendments to

§ 77-38-2(6) eliminated this appeal right except for persons "found
not guilty by reason of insanity."
of

appeal,

the

PSRB

procedures

constitutional right to appeal.

Absent this fundamental right
violate

due

process

and

the

The order of the PSRB must be

vacated.
POINT VI.
THE PSRB'S DENIAL OF COMPULSORY
PROCESS AND FINANCIAL ACCESS TO EXPERT
TESTIMONY
VIOLATED
MR.
PALL'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I,
SECTIONS
7
AND
12
OF
THE
UTAH
CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
Mr. Dall's PSRB hearing was a "critical stage" of his
case.

"The defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of

the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he
may

have

no

right

sentencing process."
S.Ct. 1197,

to

object

to

a

particular

result

of

the

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97

, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977).

The legislature itself

recognized the importance of PSRB proceedings by requiring access
to counsel when PSRB orders are appealed.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-

2(6) (prior to March 13, 1990 amendments) . Obviously, if an appeal
of a PSRB order is a critical stage, the hearing leading to that
order is also a critical stage.
Fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to "an
adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the
adversary system."

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct.
48

2437,

, 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 353 (1974).

"[W]hen the State has made

the defendant's mental condition relevant . . .

to the punishment

he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be
crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense." Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80, 105 S.Ct. 1087,

, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 64

(1985) .
The

PSRB

hearing

was

specifically

addressed

question of the proper facility to house Mr. Dall.

to

the

The nature of

his punishment and severity of his incarceration were directly
implicated.
determined

As of that time, no judicial or other entity had
that prison was appropriate

for Mr. Dall.

entitled to a fair opportunity to present his case.

He was
Mr. Dall

wanted to call Dr. Breck LeBegue to testify on his behalf, but was
not afforded the opportunity.

Compare February 25, 1991 letter

(requesting compulsory process and funding for expert testimony)
(exhibit 7 at evidentiary hearing, attached as Addendum E) with
June 28, 1991 PSRB hearing transcript (Exhibit 1; only Dr. Washburn
called, Mr. Dall called no experts or other witnesses, as he could
not afford to pay Dr. LeBegue for expert testimony).

The failure

of the PSRB to provide Mr. Dall the means of presenting his case
require that the PSRB's order be vacated.
CONCLUSION
In making its order, the Psychiatric Security Review
Board illegally applied an arbitrary and capricious and ex
facto

post

"maximum benefit" standard, rather than the proper standards

found in § 77-16-5 and § 62A-12-241. The lack of a right of appeal
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violates Mr. Dall's constitutional right to an appeal, and causes
the

delegation

of

judicial

power

to

the

PSRB

to violate

separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution.

the

Denial of

compulsory process and financial means to obtain expert testimony
likewise violates Mr. Dall's constitutional rights.
the PSRB cannot stand, and should be vacated.

The order of

Mr. Dall should be

returned to the State Hospital.19

19

If Mr. Dall prevails here, a question is raised over who
properly has jurisdiction. Appellant asserts that his case should
be referred to Judge Hanson for a review of sentence.
See
petitioner's Pre-Hearing Memorandum at 6-7, R. 288-323 at 293-4:
Jurisdiction over Mr. Dall passed from the trial court to
the PSRB pursuant to the judge's sentencing order dated August 10,
1989.
The PSRB initiated transfer proceedings by holding its
evidentiary hearings and entering its orders, but no transfer to
the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons was ever consummated. The
order entered provided:
Until such time as the Board of Pardons
conducts a hearing and custody is assumed by the Board of
Pardons, Kirk Wesley Dall shall remain in the custody of
the Utah State Hospital.
The order entered was an illegal application of an ex
post facto
law, and therefore can have no effect. . . . Utah R.
Crim. P. 21.5(6) (1993) governed transfer from the PSRB.
This
section expressly provides that mentally ill offenders remain under
the jurisdiction of the PSRB until the Board of Pardons takes
action. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5(e) (effective March 13, 1990) is
to the same effect.
For all these reasons, the PSRB retained jurisdiction
over Mr. Dall up to the time the PSRB ceased to exist on July 1,
1992.
When the PSRB ceased to exist, it is unclear where
jurisdiction in Mr. Dall reverted. Mr. Dall asserts that the only
logical place for jurisdiction to revert is back to the sentencing
trial court. The trial court is the only other entity that ever
had jurisdiction over Mr. Dall, and is the entity that had
jurisdiction immediately prior to the PSRB.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of June, 1994.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

R. MOFI^ r
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be delivered to
James H. Beadles, Attorney General's Office, 330 South 300 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 2nd day of June, 1994.

Robert K. Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

}
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day of June, 1994.

ADDENDUM A
August 10, 1989 Sentence

Tmra Judfdal Otaer

JASES C. BHADSHAff, #3753
Attorney for Defendant
SALS SAKE £ECAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
Telephone r 532-5444
ZS THE DISTRICT COUBT OF THE THL3D JUDICIAL DISTSICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTT, STATS OF UTAH
TEE STATE OF UTAH/
Plaintiff,
v.

z

ORDER

:
i

KT2K ff- DALL,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 88139IS95FS
JUDGE THK3TET R. HANSON

:

The above-entitled setter came on for hearing on the 28th
of July, 1589. The defendant appearing with counsel, JANES C.
BEADSHAW, and the State represented by TON VU2J1.
After hearing the testimony of Dr. Srecic LeSegue, Monica
Ebert, and reviewing the written opinion letter of the Utah State
Sospital the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence?
1}

That the defendant, Kirk W. Dail, suffers from a mental

disease or defect as defined in 576-2-305.
2}

That because of his mental illness the defendant poses

a danger to others if placed in a probational setting.
3)

That because of the defendant's mental condition, there

is a serious risk that he will be harmed or killed if he is put in
the Utah State Prison.

4)

That t h e dangers o u t l i n e d in paragraphs 2 and 3 above

a r e immediate i n t h e sense

contemplated by the p o l i c i e s and g o a l s of

t h e G u i l t y and Mentally 111 s t a t u t e and as a r t i c u l a t e d i n s t a t e r .
C o o e l a n d , 765 9 .2d 1166 (Utah 1388 J •
5)

That t h e Utah S t a t e Hospital i s an adequate and

a p p r o p r i a t e f a c i l i t y t o meet the defendant's care and treatment
needs .
Based upon t h e foregoing findings the Court orders that the
d e f e n d a n t be committed t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the P s y c h i a t r i c
S e c u r i t y Review Board to be placed in the Utah State S o s p i t a l where
he I s t o undergo any or a l l treatment that i s deemed appropriate •
DAIZD t h i s

/0

day of Augustf> 1389 •
BTyTEK\CTUKt:

/TUCG2 TUiOTHT 2T-2AilS0H
/ t h i r d D i s t r i c t Cour;

DELIVSSED a copy of the foregoing Co the Office of the S a l t
Cake Country A t t o r n e y , 231 East: 400 Souta, S a l t Lake C i t y , titan 84111
thLs

_ _ _ _ day of August, 1 9 8 9 .
• zsmpf W<*T "Has io * THUS GCPV SIT A.
czusNAL oocuMerr a * sue I N THE TKZZ
otSwHcr c3Ufrr.SACTtxkscownr. STATS ~
UTAH.
/
7
_^y

Co-p^t* ps*jj4fcu&^ *7^*cw Sc^</ " = V >vt

ADDENDUM B
April 24, 1991 PSRB Order

PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD
Social Services Bldg.
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
(801)538-4504

ORDER OF THE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD, STATE OF UTAH
Kirk Wesley Dall)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

On August 10, 1989, the above-named defendant, having been
found guilty and mentally ill, was committed by the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to the Utah State Prison for a
period of not less than one (1) or more than fifteen (15) years for
forcible sexual abuse and for a period of not less than one (1) or
more

than

fifteen

concurrently.

(15) years

for

kidnapping

to

be

served

On that date the defendant was ordered hospitalized

at the Utah State Hospital and placed under the jurisdiction of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
S77-35-21.5.
On December 17, 1990, the Utah State Hospital petitioned the
Psychiatric Security Review Board to hold a statutory hearing on
Kirk Wesley Dall to determine whether placement outside of the Utah
State Hospital was appropriate.

The hearing was set for January

18, 1991.
On January 17, 1991, Mr. Dall's defense attorney, requested a
continuance.

The hearing was rescheduled for February 15, 1991.

On February 8, 1991, Mr. Dall's attorney informed the Board that he
would not be able to make the hearing on February 15, 1991.

The

hearing was continued to March 15, 1991.

On March 15, 1991, a

hospital staff witness necessary to Mr. Dall's case did not appear.
The case was continued until April 19, 1991.
On April

19, 1991, Kirk Wesley Dall appeared before the

Psychiatric Security Review Board.
Bradshaw,

from

the

Legal

represented by Jeff Hunt.

He was represented by James

Defender's

Office;

the

State

was

Upon a complete review of the records

and an interview with Mr. Dall, the Board found by clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit from
treatment at the Hospital and that custody should be transferred to
the Utah State Board of Pardons.

THEREFORE, THE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD ORDERS THAT KXRK
WESLEY DALL BE DISCHARGED FROM THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL AND THAT HE
BE REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY AND JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH STATE BOARD
OF PARDONS.

Recommendation to the Board of Pardons: It is recommended by
the Board that Mr. Dall's psychotropic medications be continued.

Until such time as the Board of Pardons conducts a hearing and
custody is assumed by the Board of Pardons, Kirk Wesley Dall shall
remain in the custody of the Utah State Hospital.
Dated this 24th day of April, 1991.

&/yK$tiUHt 0M- Review Board
Psychiatric Security
Chairman

ADDENDUM C
July 2, 1991 PSRB Order

PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVTEW BOARD
Social Services Bldg.
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
(801)538-4504

ORDER OF THE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD, STATE OF UTAH
Kirk Wesley Dall)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

On August 10, 1989, the above-named defendant, having been
found guilty and mentally ill, was committed by the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to the Utah State Prison for a
period of not less than one (1) or more than fifteen (15) years for
forcible sexual abuse and for a period of not less than one (1) or
more

than

fifteen

concurrently.

(15) years

for

kidnapping

to

be

served

On that date the defendant was ordered hospitalized

at the Utah State Hospital until the completion of his sentence or
until the Psychiatric

Security Review Board deemed

otherwise

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated S77-35-21.5.
On December 17, 1990, the Utah State Hospital petitioned the
Psychiatric Security Review Board to hold a statutory hearing on
Kirk Wesley Dall to determine whether placement outside of the Utah
State Hospital was appropriate. The hearing was set for January 18,
1991.
On January 17, 1991, Mr. Dall's defense attorney, requested a
continuance.

The hearing was rescheduled for February 15, 1991.

Mr. Dall's attorney was unable to make the hearing in February and
the hearing was rescheduled for March 15, 1991. On March 15, 1991,

a hospital staff witness necessary to Mr- Dall's case did not
appear.

The case was continued until April 17, 1991.

On April 17, 1991, Kirk Wesley Dall appeared before the
Psychiatric Security Review Board.
Bradshaw,

from

the

Legal

represented by Jeff Hunt.

He was represented by James

Defender's

Office;

the

State

was

Upon a complete review of the records

and an* interview with Mr. Dall, the Board found by clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Dall had received mffxtTrmm benefit from
treatment at the Hospital and that custody should be transferred to
the Utah State Board of Pardons.
Mr. Bradshaw appealed the findings of the Board on June 3,
1991.

At that time it was discovered that the tape recorder had

failed to record the hearing.

The defense attorney and the

attorney representing the State were unable to reach an agreement
upon the content of the hearing.

The hearing was rescheduled for

June 28, 1991.
On June 28, 1991, after a complete review of the records and
an interview with Mr. Dall, the Board found again by clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit from
treatment at the Utah State Hospital and that custody should be
transferred to the Utah State Board of Pardons.

THEREFORE, THE PSYCHTATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD ORDERS THAT KIRK
WESLEY DALL BE DISCHARGED FROM THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL AND THAT HE
BE REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY AND JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH STATE BOARD
OF PARDONS.

Until such time as the Board of Pardons conducts a hearing and
custody is assumed by the Board of Pardons, Kirk Wesley Oall shall
remain in the custody of the Utah State Hospital •
Dated this 2nd day of July, 1991.

PSychiatrlc Security Review Board

Copies sent to: Mr. Bradshaw, Mr. Hunt, the Board of Pardons, the
Appellate Court

ADDENDUM D
January 17, 1991 letter

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
532-5444

Established in 1965
JOHN HILL
Okmaot

OARO OF TRUSTEES
IMIMITSUNAGA
Chavmm
L GILBERT ATHAY
IARVIN W. OAVIS
IONEL H. FRANKEL
OSEPH A. GETER
AY GROUSSMAN
TEVUART HANSON. JR.
ON HINOE
0 CAROL NESSET-SALE
OHN O'CONNELL

January 17, 1991

IRANTH. PALMER

Ms. Cheryl Hansen
Administrative Assistant
Psychiatric Review Board
120 North 200 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Dear Ms. Hansen:
I hereby request permission to appear before the
Psychiatric Review Board on behalf of Mr. Kirk Dall. However, I
would request that the matter set for January 18, 1991 be continued
so that I might have adequate time to address the relevant issues.
I have spoken with Mr. Dall and he is in full support of both my
representation and my request to continue the matter.
In the short time I have considered this matter I have had
some difficulty in finding the standards which will be applied at
Mr. Dall.'s hearing. I would request that the guidelines the board
will use in determining whether the defendant should remain in the
hospital be provided to me prior to Mr. Oall's hearing.
Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated.

JCB:ejo

ADDENDUM E
February 25, 1991 letter

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
532-5444
Established in 1965
F. JOHN HILL
Director

BOARD OF TRUSTEES
JIM! MITSUNAGA
Charman

0. GILBERT ATHAY
MARVIN W. OAVIS
UONEL H. FRANKEL
JOSEPH A. GETER
RAY GROUSSMAN
STEWART HANSON. JR.
LON HINOE
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE
JOHN O'CONNELL
GRANT H. PALMER

February 25, 1991

Ms* Cheryl Hansen
Psychiatric Security Review Board
125 North 200 West
3rd Floor
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84103
RE:

Kirk Dall

Dear Us. Hansen:
In preparing for the upcoming hearing before the
Psychiatric Security Review Board it appears to me that there will
be a need for Mr. Dall to retain experts to testify on his behalf at
the hearing. I would specifically request that Dr. Breck LeBegue
and Dr. Vickie Gregory be appointed to offer independant evidence on
the defendant's mental status and his prognosis. I am concerned
about the independence of the hospital experts in light of the
obvious overcrowding at the hospital.
It is my opinion that Mr. Dall's appearance before the
Psychiatric Security Review Board is a "critical stage" in the
proceedings against him and accordingly he should be entitled the
fundamental rights guaranteed a criminal defendant under the Utah
State and United states Constitutions.
Accordingly, I am formally
requesting appointment, and payment by the State, of all costs

associated with the retention of independant experts. Drs. Gregory
and LeBegue both presented evidence at the time Kirk appeared before
Judge Hansen for determination of whether he qualified as guilty and
mentally ill. Your promptest response to this request would be
greatly appreciated.
Sincerely*/

fJAMES C. BRADSHAW
ibrney at Law

JCBrejo

ADDENDUM F
Statutory and Constitutional Provisions

Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the United States
Constitution provides:
No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance,
or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal;
coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligations of contracts, or grant any title of
nobility.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.

The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Bail -- Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.

Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property. without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Emphasis added.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 9

[Excessive bail and fines -- Cruel punishments]

Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec, 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.

Article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. [Attainder --Ex post facto laws -- Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Section 1.

[Three departments of government.]

The powers of the government of the State of
Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments,
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in
the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.

Article

VIII,

section

5

of

the

Utah

Constitution

provides:
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts
-- Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs.
The district court shall have
appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute.
The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and
appellate, shall be provided by statute.
Except for
matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there
shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court
of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89 (1991) provides:
17-5-89.

Mental health and substance abuse services.

The board of county commissioners of each
county shall provide mental health services in accordance
with Chapter 12, Title 62A, and substance abuse services
in accordance with Chapter 8, Title 62A.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-209(1) (Supp. 1992) provides:
62A-12-209.
Objectives of state hospital and other
facilities -- Persons who may be admitted to state
hospital.
(1) The objectives of the state hospital and other
mental health facilities shall be to care for all persons
within this state who are subject to the provisions of
this part; and to furnish them with the proper
attendance,
medical
treatment,
seclusion,
rest,
restraint, amusement, occupation, and support that is
conducive to their physical and mental well-being.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-229 (Supp. 1992) provides:
62A-12-229.

Release from commitment.

(3) When the patient has been committed to the
division under judicial proceedings, the division shall
use the procedures described in Sections 62A-12-240 and
62A-12-241.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-223 (1989) provides:
62A-12-223. Abuse of mentally ill persons -- Criminal
and civil liability.
Anyone having care of a mentally ill person who
unduly restrains that person, either with or without
authority, or who treats that person with wanton severity
or cruelty, or in any way abuses that person, is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor, in addition to liability in an
action for damages, or subject to other criminal charges.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-240 (Supp. 1992) provides:
62A-12-240.

Periodic review and discharge.

The director or his designee shall, as
frequently as practicable, examine or cause to be
examined every person committed to the division.
Whenever the director or his designee determines that the
conditions justifying involuntary commitment no longer
exist, he shall discharge the patient. If the patient
has been committed through judicial proceedings, a report
describing that determination shall be sent to the clerk
of the court where the proceedings were held.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992) provides:
62A-12-241.
Release of patient to receive other
treatment -- Placement in more restrictive environment -Procedures•
(1) The director or his designee may release an
improved patient to less restrictive treatment as may be
specified by the director or his designee, and agreed to
in writing by the patient. Whenever the director or his
designee determines that the conditions justifying
commitment no longer exist, the patient shall be

discharged.
If the patient has been committed through
judicial
proceedings,
a
report
describing
that
determination shall be sent to the clerk of the court
where the proceedings were held.
(2) (a)
The director or his designee
is
authorized to issue an order for the immediate
placement of a patient not previously released
from an order of commitment into a more
restrictive environment, if the director or his
designee has reason to believe that the less
restrictive environment in which the patient has
been placed is aggravating the patient's mental
illness as defined in Subsection 62A-12-234 (10) ,
or that the patient has failed to comply with the
specified treatment plan to which the patient had
agreed in writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(4) (1990) provided:
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or
defect. A mental defect may be a congenital condition or
one the result of injury or a residual effect of a
physical or mental disease Mental illness does not mean
a personality or character disorder or abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980) provides:
77-16-5.

Recovery of committed person -- Certification
to Board of Pardons.

(1) A person committed to the state hospital after
sentence who has sufficiently recovered from his mental
disease or defect shall be certified to the Board of
Pardons by the clinical director.
Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person
shall be transferred to the Board of Pardons and he shall
be pardoned, paroled, or confined in the state prison for
the unexpired term of the offense as provided by law with
credit for time served while confined at the hospital.
The certification of the clinical director of the
hospital shall specify with particularity the medical
facts justifying his certification.
(2) The provisions of law and the rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding
parole shall apply to persons paroled from the state
hospital.
Emphasis added.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5

(effective March 13, 1990)

(repealed July 1, 1992) provided:
77-16a-5.

Discharge from psychiatric Security Review
Board -- Board of Pardons -- Parole -- Review.

With regard to mentally ill but not mentally retarded
persons:
(1) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security
Review Board shall review the condition of each
person under its jurisdiction at the
state
hospital, to determine whether custody should be
transferred to the Board of Pardons.
(2) (a) If at any time after commitment of a
person to the hospital under Section 77-16a-4
whose sentence has not expired, if the
superintendent
of
the hospital, or
his
designee, is of the opinion that the person:
(i) is no longer mentally ill, or (ii) is
still mentally ill and continues to be a
danger to himself or others, but can be
controlled if proper care, medication, and
treatment are provided, and, in either case,
(iii) has reached maximum benefit from the
programs at the hospital, the superintendent
or his designee shall apply to the Psychiatric
Security Review Board for a transfer of
custody to the Board of Pardons.
(b) The application shall be accompanied by
a report setting forth the facts supporting
the opinion of the superintendent or his
designee, which shall include the clinical
facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment
received at the hospital, the prognosis of the
remission of the symptoms, the potential for
recidivism and the danger to himself or
others, and the recommendations for future
treatment. If the recommendations included in
the application involve treatment in the
community under conditions of parole or
conditional release, the application must also
be
accompanied
by
a verified
plan
of
treatment.
(3) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review
Board proposes to transfer custody of a
defendant from the Utah State Hospital to the
Board of Pardons prior to the expiration of
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of
Pardons a report on the condition of the
defendant, including all pertinent information
supplied
by
the
superintendent
or
his
designee.

(b) The Psychiatric Security Review Board
may make recommendations to the Board of
Pardons as follows:
(i) that the defendant serve any or
all of his unexpired term of sentence at
the state prison;
(ii) that the defendant be placed on
parole; or
(iii)
that
the
defendant
be
recommitted to the jurisdiction of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board for
conditional release in accordance with
Chapter 38 of this title.
(c) If the Psychiatric Security Review
Board recommends to the Board of Pardons that
a defendant be placed on parole or be placed
under
its
jurisdiction
for
conditional
release,
it
shall
submit
with
that
recommendation a specific program for the
care, custody, and treatment of the defendant.
If
the
defendant
is placed
under
the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security
Review Board by the Board of Pardons for
conditional release, failure to complete that
program shall be grounds for revocation of
conditional release in accordance with Chapter
38 of this title.
(d) The Board of Pardons shall direct that
the defendant serve any or all of the
unexpired term of the sentence at the Utah
State Prison, place the defendant on parole,
or commit the defendant to the jurisdiction of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board for
conditional release in accordance with Chapter
38.
(e) Pending action of the Board of Pardons,
the
defendant
shall
remain
under
the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security
Review Board at the Utah State Hospital.
(4) (a) If the defendant is placed on parole,
treatment shall, upon the recommendation of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board, be made
a condition of parole.
Failure to continue
treatment or other condition of parole except
by agreement with the designated mental health
services provider and the Board of Pardons is
a basis for initiation of parole violation
hearings by the Board of Pardons.
(b) The period of parole may not be for
fewer than five years or until the expiration
of the defendant's sentence, whichever occurs
first, and may not be reduced
without
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a

current report on the mental health status of
the offender.
Emphasis added.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (3) (a) (effective July
1992) provides:
77-16a-203. Review of guilty and mentally ill persons
committed to department -- Recommendations for
transfer.
(3) (a) The executive director shall notify the UDC
medical administrator, and the board's mental
health adviser that a mentally ill offender is
eligible for transfer to UDC if the review team
finds that the offender:
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or
(ii) is still mentally ill and continues to
be a danger to himself or others, but can be
controlled if adequate care, medication, and
treatment are provided, and that he has reached
maximum benefit from the programs within the
department.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) (as amended March 13, 19
(red-lined form) (repealed July 1, 1992) provided:
(6) When a person over whom the board exercises
jurisdiction, who has bean adjudicated and found to be
ftfirit guilty by x«ft6an of ins&nlty, is adversely affected
or aggrieved by a final order of the board, that: person
is entitled to judicial review of the final order by the
Court of Appeals only if the court finds, based upon a
review of the evidence contained in the record, that
there is no substantial evidence that supports the
conclusion of the board, or that the board's decision was
arbitrary and capricious. If judicial review is granted,
the person is entitled to counsel. If the person is
indigent, counsel shall be appointed in accordance with
Chapter 32 of this title.

